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Abstract 
The connection between Godwin and Fénelon has traditionally been restricted to the 
famous and controversial moment in the first edition of Political Justice (1793) in which 
Godwin presents an example of the interdependence of rationality and ethical action. This 
paper argues, however, that Fénelon, and particularly his political and educational treatise 
Telemachus (1699), plays a significant role in a number of Godwin’s subsequent fictional 
works. Employing Telemachus to explore the theories of education presented by Godwin 
in the various editions of Political Justice and The Enquirer (1797), this paper explores 
the manner in which Godwin’s version of the Enlightenment transcendence of 
pedagogical power comes up against its limits. Reading this issue in relation to Godwin’s 
argument, in ‘Of Choice in Reading’, that literature remains outside of socio-ethical 
corruption, three of Godwin’s major novels are shown to demonstrate that Telemachus 
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provides the chance for meta-textual moments in which the appeal to reason (the reader’s 
rational capacity or ‘private judgement’) is at once reflected upon and produced. Reading 
educational theories and problems into Godwin’s major fiction in this fashion helps to 
clarify aspects of the Godwinian (or ‘Jacobin’) novel. 
 
 
 Given that Godwin famously chose to save the life of François de Salignac de la 
Mothe Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai, rather than the life of a chambermaid, in the first 
edition of Political Justice, and given that in subsequent editions Godwin went on saving 
Fénelon’s life (in favour of a substitute valet), even after the public fallout of that first 
rescue, where else does Fénelon feature, other than in Thoughts Occasioned by the 
Perusal of Dr Parr’s Spital Sermon, in Godwin’s oeuvre?1 The answer is that we can 
find Fénelon if we look for him in Godwin’s novels. Finding him there raises questions 
about the relationship between Godwin’s philosophy of education and his fiction.  
                                                
 
I. 
The irresolvable contradictions within the subject of education are a constant theme and 
subject of enquiry within Godwin’s work. Either teaching is a necessary evil (inevitably 
implicated in a hierarchical despotism); or teaching can be reformed, made reasonable 
(extricated from power and an imposition on private judgement). That is the issue for a 
philosopher of education, and Godwin is a philosopher of education. If our answer is the 
latter, then teaching as a formal institution and practice can and should transcend itself, 
 
1 See Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin. Vol. 2. Political Writings II. Ed. Mark 
Philp. (London: William Pickering, 1993) 163-213. 
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do away with itself, disappear. We might look at one of the great final moments of 
Political Justice, Book VIII, Chapter VI, in which Godwin imagines a fully rational 
society: 
No creature in human form will be expected to learn anything, but because he 
desires it and has some conception of its utility and value; every man, in 
proportion to his capacity, will be ready to furnish such general hints and 
comprehensive views, as will suffice for the guidance and encouragement of him 
who studies from a principle of desire.2  
 
This vision of education or instruction in a reformed society (and I have only quoted a 
small portion) resolves many of the problems that dog anyone who would present a 
philosophy of education. It resolves what appears to be the inextricable link between 
education and power. It resolves the accompanying problem of what I call in-forming, 
that is the notion that in educating we mould, shape, impress, in-form the mind of the 
student.3 In The Enquirer, Godwin puts this last issue perfectly when he states that 
‘When a child is born, one of the earliest purposes of his institutor ought to be, to awak
his mind, to breathe a soul into the as yet, unformed mass.’
en 
 
                                                
4 In the 1796 and 1798 
versions of Political Justice Godwin asserts: ‘Make men wise, and by that very operation
 
2 An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness (1793). 
Political and Philosophical Writings. Vol. 3. Ed. Mark Philp. (London: William Pickering, 1993) 455. 
Hereafter cited parenthetically as PJ III, with page number. 
3 See my ‘On Information and the Chance of Teaching.’ Formless: Ways in and out of Form. Ed. Pat 
Crowley and Paul Hegarty. (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005) 27-37. 
4 William Godwin, The Enquirer. Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature. Political and 
Philosophical Writings Vol. 5. Educational and Literary Writings. Ed. Pamela Clemit. (London: William 
Pickering, 1993), 83. 
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you make them free.’5 Here we have a great example of the problem of in-forming, since 
in making, moulding, shaping a man you are not liberating but enslaving them. Inform
can mean ‘without shape,’ but it can also mean ‘mis-shapen,’ something monstrous.  
How do you inform without obliterating, repressing, enslaving private judgement? How 
do you inform without in-forming? The passage above demonstrates that the answer
comes in the disappearance of the teacher, the preceptor. So in such a society Godwin 
also imagines a resolution of the problem of whether education should be public or
private. In this scenario it is really neither, since the distinctions of public (institutiona
and private (domestic, filial) have considerably softened, dissolved even. In any case, 
children simply learn what they need and what they desire to learn, then as Godwin 
imagines it, they can take ‘hints’ and ‘comprehensive views’ from who ever they wish. 
The child is in need of instruction and finds numerous appropriate and willing teachers; 
which is to say it finds numerous friends. To think about education in Godwin and his 
circle is to think long and hard about that over-determined word friend, a word which 
means many things, one of the most important being a teacher,
 
 
 
l) 
if 
 a guide, a mentor.  
                                                
 But how can one be a friend before the child has become an adult? How can one 
be a friend to a human being who is powerless? In a situation, that is, in which the teacher 
is all-powerful? Pedagogy is the great problem within any philosophy of education. It 
seems to necessitate a postponement of equality and thus of friendship and by so doing it 
threatens the very possibility for equality and friendship. A friend, the friend, is a mentor 
and an equal. On the apparent basis of commonsense it would appear that we can only 
gain rational, equal (and thus true) friendships when we become adults, reasonable 
 
5 Political and Philosophical Writings Vol. 4. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Variants. Ed. Mark 
Philp. (London: William Pickering, 1993) 128. Hereafter cited parenthetically as PJ IV, with page number. 
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subjects with informed judgement. Yet we precisely need a friend, the friend, when we 
are children. There is a kind of terrible postponement or deferral involved in the notion of 
pedagogy and indeed in the notion of childhood, a deferral which threatens the very 
foundations of a rational, equal society. Pedagogy mirrors our political institutions, so 
that, for example, in Locke’s account we must go through the pedagogical stage of 
monarchical control and power before we can arrive at the stage of adult equality.6 
Pedagogy has within it the great question of political theory: how do we institute, found, 
a new state? How do you found, institute enlightenment and equality? How do you make 
someone free? In Book VII of Political Justice, in the chapter ‘Of Law,’ Godwin writes: 
 
As long as a man is held in the trammels of obedience, and habituated to look to 
some foreign guidance for the direction of his conduct, his understanding and the 
vigour of his mind will sleep. Do I desire to raise him to the energy of which he is 
capable? I must teach him to feel himself, to bow to no authority, to examine the 
principles he entertains, and render to his mind the reason of his conduct. (PJ III, 
415-6) 
 
How do you teach someone to be independent of thought? How do you teach someone to 
bow to no authority? How do you render reason to someone when the principle of reason, 
at least in Godwin’s hands, argues that reason renders itself, that reason, that is, comes 
from the individual’s private judgement?7 As Godwin writes in Book II of Political 
                                                 
6 John Locke. Some Thoughts Concerning Education. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke. 
Ed. John W. and Jean S. Yolton. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 109. 
7 The Enlightenment tenet that reason can be rendered can be traced back to the philosophy of Leibniz. For 
an interesting discussion of this Leibnizian ‘principle of reason’ readers should consult Jacques Derrida’s 
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Justice: ‘To a rational being there can be but one rule of conduct, justice, and one mode 
of ascertaining that rule, the exercise of his understanding’ (PJ III, 72). He adds in the 
1798 version: ‘the conviction of man’s individual understanding is the only legitimate 
principle, imposing on him the duty of adopting any species of conduct’ (PJ IV, 86). How 
do you teach someone that they must think, reason for themselves?  
 The great chapter on education in Political Justice is obviously Book I Chapter 
IV, in the revised and expanded later editions. Godwin writes: ‘education never can be 
equal. The inequality of external circumstances in two beings whose situations most 
nearly resemble is so great, as to baffle all power of calculation. In this present state of 
mankind this is eminently the case’ (PJ IV, 22). Education is unequal and its effects 
incalculable; in the present state of mankind. He then goes on: ‘It is impossible to believe 
that the same moral train would not make nearly the same man’ (22). Education can be 
equal and can be calculable. For now, as he states in The Enquirer: ‘All education is 
despotism. It is perhaps impossible for the young to be conducted without introducing in 
many cases the tyranny of implicit obedience. Go there; do that; read; write; rise; lie 
down; will perhaps for ever be the language addressed to youth by age’ (Enquirer, 107). 
Education, it would seem, partakes of that division so important to the Jacobin literature 
of post-revolutionary England: ‘things as they are,’ and ‘things as they should be’ or 
‘could be.’ But it would also appear that it is extraordinarily difficult to move from the 
first to the second state. Teaching appears to be a necessary evil. Power, hierarchy, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils.’ Trans. Catherine Porter and Edward P. 
Morris. Diacritics 13.3 (1983) 3-21. The same essay is now reprinted in Jacques Derrida. Eyes of the 
University, Right to Philosophy 2. Trans. Jan Plug and Others. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 
129-155. 
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irrational command, in-forming, haunt the prospect of rational, enlightened pedagogy, or 
informing.  
 It is in The Enquirer that we see Godwin really grappling with the duality or 
fold in the idea and practice of teaching. If we take that issue as our focus, we find in fact 
that Part One of The Enquirer has more of an overall shape and logic than has previously 
been noted. I cannot here go into the manner in which the essays which comprise the first 
volume of The Enquirer rehearse and deepen the problematic of education, already 
encountered in the first edition of Political Justice. I will simply say that the tension 
between the need for instruction (or pedagogy) and the Enlightenment ideal of the 
disappearance of the teacher functions as a structural problem, an aporia even, throughout 
the essays. I would also suggest that the apparently irresolvable fold within pedagogy – 
the tension between reason and power, equality and hierarchy, friendship and deceit – is 
in some senses resolved for Godwin in his move, in Essay XV, to literature. Godwin has 
already declared, in Essay V, that ‘Literature, taken in all its bearings, forms the grand 
line of demarcation between the human and the animal kingdoms’ (95). Now, at this 
stage of On Educations, Manners and Literature, we see literature emerging as a 
potential cure for the impossible problems education has raised. Literature, this essay will 
inform us, is incapable of in-forming. 
 The essay, ‘Of Choice in Reading,’ starts with the issue of friendship: ‘It is 
essentially hostile to all mystery,’ he writes (136). It moves on to make an argument 
which has huge implications in the Romantic period, a period (as we know) in which the 
phenomenon of a mass ‘reading public’ made the issue of reading itself highly 
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controversial, highly political.8 The argument in a nutshell is this: books do not corrupt 
their readers: ‘Every thing depends upon the spirit in which they are read’ (141). Making 
a distinction between a book’s apparent moral and its tendency, Godwin places the 
emphasis on the latter: ‘It appears not unlikely that, in some cases, a work may be fairly 
susceptible of no moral inference, or none but a bad one, and yet may have a tendency in 
a high degree salutary and advantageous . . . . A bad moral to a work, is a very equivocal 
proof of a bad tendency’ (139-40). He admits of the difficulty of ascertaining the 
tendency; the difficulty being caused by the fact that the tendency is and yet is not in the 
work (i.e. it is partly, even largely, in the reader). But what is crucial, is that in this vision 
of literature and its reception we get a resolution of the problem posed by pedagogy. We 
should be careful here: literature does not resolve the problem of pedagogy; it resolves in 
itself the aporia – between reason and power, equality and hierarchy, friendship and 
deceit – posed by pedagogy. Literature, that is to say, is a space in which this aporia does 
not apply, is suspended if you will. Obviously there are numerous bad, inaccurate, 
immoral readers, and there will be so as long as society remains in its corrupt and 
despotic state. But books, literature, in themselves cannot in-form us, they cannot mis-
shape and corrupt us. Maybe there is a space in which education can transcend, unfold 
the haunting of reason by power, of equality by hierarchy, of friendship by deceit, and 
maybe this space is the space of books, and especially of literature. Godwin’s novel 
readers can find the basic point of his essay on reading in the following passage from 
Cloudesley: 
                                                 
8 For discussions of Godwin’s own readership see Pamela Clemit. The Godwinian Novel: The Rational 
Fictions of Godwin, Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) pp.8-9. For a 
discussion of the politics of reading within the context of debates around education in the period, see Alan 
Richardson. Literature, Education and Romanticism: Readings as a Social  Practice, 1780-1832. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University .Press, 1994). 
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It is common to recommend great cautiousness as to the books that shall be put 
into the hands of young persons. Nothing can be so senseless and futile as this. In 
almost all cases he that shall be corrupted by the details of what he reads, must 
bring a corrupt heart to the perusal. The old, and those who are used to the ways 
of vice, find guilt and provocatives of guilt in every page. The young pass them 
by, unconscious of their existence. In this, the noblest of all senses, it may be said 
in the language of holy writ, ‘To the pure all things are pure.’9 
 
Literature here, as in ‘Of Choice in Reading,’ is presented as a medium, a mode of 
communication, in which the fold or aporia within education is suspended. That is to say, 
Godwin wishes to present a vision of literature in which reason is perfectly, transparently 
rendered. It could be argued that what Godwin is arguing is quite clear and forms part of 
his gradualist account of reform and perfectibility. However, on a wider level, it seems 
possible to read Godwin’s distinction between the moral (he goes on to talk about the 
moral tendency) and the intellectual tendency as a version of what we have been calling 
in-forming and informing: the first, a process of educational malformation, the second the 
process in which, through the scene of teaching, reason comes to render itself. Such a 
perspective might help us begin to see the relation between Godwin’s work on education 
and his practice as a novelist. Does the Godwinian novel found and form itself on a 
literary resolution of the aporias, the folds and the duplicities of the educational scene? 
and if the answer to that question is affirmative, at least in terms of intention, then how 
does that resolution work? It is perhaps time we moved to a consideration of Fénelon, an 
                                                 
9 Collected Novels and Memoirs of William Godwin. Vol. 7. Cloudesley. Ed. Maurice Hindle. (London: 
William Pickering, 1992) 221. Godwin cites the same Biblical passage in ‘Of Choice in Reading.’ (The 
Enquirer, 143). 
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author who in the last year of the seventeenth century produced a text, Telemachus, 
which is at one and the same time a philosophical and fictional work of and on education. 
 
II. 
Telemachus (1699) was a hugely popular text in the eighteenth century. Written to 
instruct his tutee, the Duke of Burgundy, eldest grandson of Louis XIV and thus heir to 
the French throne, it deals with Telemachus’s adventures in the period between Books V 
and XV of The Odyssey. Telemachus tries to find his father and return to Ithaca as 
Ulysses himself is struggling to get home. It was read as a political critique of Louis XIV 
and got Fénelon banned from Versailles and effectively from Paris. The Duke of 
Burgundy died in 1712 and so never came to the throne and never was able to realize the 
political ideals represented in Fénelon’s text and his teaching. For Patrick Riley, editor of 
the Cambridge translation, as for many before him, including Rousseau, the real hero of 
the text is not Telemachus, it is Mentor, his teacher. Mentor is in fact Minerva (Athene) 
in disguise, although this is not revealed to Telemachus until the very last pages of the 
text, immediately after Telemachus has met but not known his father in disguise, and just 
before Minerva, now revealed, ascends into the air and Telemachus himself returns to 
Book XV of The Odyssey.  
 We might wonder what Godwin sees in Fénelon’s text, since it appears, through 
the character of Mentor/Minerva, to simply replicate the kinds of duplicitous, doubled 
teacher-student scenarios Godwin attacked in Rousseau and critiqued in general. In what 
sense is Mentor/Minerva not just another teacher who dominates, controls and 
manipulates in the false guise of the friend? Why should Godwin prefer Fénelon’s 
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Mentor to Rousseau’s equally fictional Preceptor? Surely both Rousseau and Fénelon 
confirm the double structure of teaching Godwin wishes to transcend? 
 Patrick Riley states that proof of the heroic status of Mentor in the novel comes 
in its ending, since whilst Mentor is ‘resolved into pure Wisdom, the nominal hero barely 
reaches Ithaca.’10 In fact, Riley only gets this half right, since clearly the hero of this text 
is, firstly of course, the Duke of Burgundy, but ultimately every reader. Moreover, 
Mentor does not resolve into ‘pure Wisdom’ so much as back into the text which he/she 
has so dominated. As Minerva ascends into the heavens, Mentor is not left like a 
discarded pile of clothes, but spreads back into the text, ready for its next reading. The 
novel at its close, that is to say, produces a metacommentary on its status as a novel of 
education by staging the disappearance of the teacher in the face of the pupil-reader’s 
imperative to respond, realise, make meaningful, complete. Mentor, I would suggest, is 
the novel; or, rather, the novel is a mentor. And the reader, first the Duke of Burgundy, 
and then every reader, is the hero, the Telemachus-figure, charged with the task of 
responding to the text by fulfilling their destiny in making a better, more equitable and 
democratic society. That is at least what I am suggesting a Godwinian reading of the text 
would argue. Fénelon’s Telemachus, from a Godwinian perspective, is a text which 
stages the disappearance of the teacher and thus demonstrates the mentor-like qualities of 
literature, its ability to transcend or unfold the problems of teaching by placing the 
primary role on the reader’s active, meaning-making response. Literature, we might say, 
is written on the premise of a reason which can render itself and thus can render the true 
tendency of the literary text.  
                                                 
10 Francois Fénelon. Telemachus, Son of Ulysses. Ed. Patrick Riley. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press) xxi. 
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 A significant question posed by the Godwinian novel concerns how political 
allegory relates to a hermeneutic which privileges the reader’s freedom to read. Most 
readers agree that the move away from the didactic political novel involved a move to a 
novel form which seeks to enlist or even render the rational faculties of the reader.11 
According to Tilottama Rajan, Godwin’s essay on reading wishes to combat a relativism 
opened up by the prospect of a historicized theory of reading. That is, if one recognizes 
that the true meaning of a text might lie in its tendency rather than its intended moral, 
then one has to begin to allow for the fact, as Godwin does on a practical level, that the 
tendency and thus meaning of a text might alter over time. Godwin, Rajan argues, 
attempts to reduce the historicizing relativism of textual meaning through a ‘divinatory 
hermeneutics, which imposes a teleological direction on the history of reception, 
consistent with his own notions of perfectibility.’12 Rajan’s example is St Leon, a novel 
which she claims is consciously self-historicizing, allowing within itself for the 
recognition that, as she puts it: ‘if reading is to remain a productive activity, it must be 
historical and critical rather than prophetic’ (194). For Rajan this self-consciously 
historicized mode of Romantic textuality is described in terms of a heuristic, as opposed 
to a divinatory, hermeneutics. The word heuristic is of course perfectly suited to my 
concerns: ‘heuristic 1. Serving to find out; spec. applied to a system of education under 
which the pupil is trained to find out things for himself.’ (OED) 
 The question Godwin’s critics, especially Rajan, raise is not whether Godwin’s 
novels are heuristic (in the sense of educational); they clearly are. The question, rather, 
                                                 
11 Marilyn Butler and Mark Philp. ‘Introduction.’ Collected Novels and Memoirs. Vol. 1. Autobiography, 
Autobiographical Fragments and Reflections, Godwin/Shelley Correspondence, Memoirs. Ed. Mark Philp 
(London: William Pickering, 1992) 43-4. See also Clemit. The Godwinian Novel, 42. 
12 Tilottama Rajan. The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic Theory and 
Practice. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990) 169. 
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concerns whether the heuristic dimension of such novels can or cannot calculate their 
consequences, their effects. The question is one about reason and its ability to render 
itself, an idea which so far I have been describing in a Godwinian, necessitarian sense in 
which reason is involved in a singular reproduction; a reproduction, or replication, or 
even rebirth, unique each time. I have also been describing such a concept as a problem, a 
question, concerning the possibility of in-forming. On Rajan’s philosophically-informed 
reading there can be no guarantee that the Godwinian novel, as a space or scene of 
instruction, will not in-form rather than inform. That is to say, there is no guarantee for 
Godwin as novelist that his historically contingent novels will not eventually be read in 
ways he himself would view as malformed, in-formed, or even monstrous. Even if we 
allow for the principle of reason, and understand that principle in terms of the idea of 
reason’s ability to render itself, the recognition of the historical contingency of the 
contents of reason – reason’s forms and presentations – would suggest that a heuristic 
hermeneutics, a vision of education as able to instruct beyond power and mastery, could 
not possibly calculate the results of its future readings. 
 What a focus on Telemachus, as an intertext in the Godwinian novel, allows us 
to do is to demonstrate that such questions about reading and reason, about tendency and 
calculability, are at least partly played out in metanarrative scenes of instruction, or what  
Rajan calls scenes of reading. What these metanarrative moments tend to do is to present 
us with moments of Godwinian sincerity, a face-to-face rendition of reason usually 
unavailable in the normal course of social existence. They give us (inter)textualized 
moments of sincerity (and thus, in Godwin’s terms, of reason conveyed and received) and 
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thus suggest an on-going commitment to the idea of the novel form as a friend, a mentor, 
eye to eye amidst the ruins. 
 Three of the six major novels have significant intertextual references to 
Telemachus within them: St. Leon, Fleetwood and Cloudesley.13 Each one of them 
employs Telemachus as part of a metacommentary, a metanarrative reflection on its 
reading, its tendency. I will take these examples in reverse order.  
 Cloudesely has scattered allusions to Telemachus and to the Mentor/Minerva 
figure. Two allusions to the origin of Minerva, springing out of the head of Jove, are 
applied, respectively, to Julian and to Frederigo. These allusions intertextually mark the 
novel’s theme of the possibility of innate nobility (Cloudesley, 150, 208). But the main 
section in which Telemachus allusions accumulate is at the end of the narrative, as 
Meadows recounts his journey to Italy in search of Julian. The novel at this stage is full 
of doubles, disguised identities. Julian is ignorant of the fact that he is the real heir to the 
Alton and Danvers estates. He has been raised by Cloudesley as his son. Richard, Lord 
Danvers, his father’s brother, is an impostor, a usurper of his noble name. Meadows is to 
travel to Italy, save Julian from St Elmo, master bandit, who is really Frederigo, Count 
Camaldoli, and restore him to his former position, with Meadows now acting as the false 
father to the false son. Lord Danvers warns Meadows that ‘You will need the subtlety of 
Ulysses to guard your secret’ (252). In other words, Meadows is to act like Ulysses at the 
end of Telemachus and the end of The Odyssey, returning to his homeland in disguise to 
restore order and the son to his rightful position as heir; only this is a foreign kingdom 
and the son is to remain secretly usurped. Meadows’s reaction to Lord Danvers’s 
                                                 
13 A reference to Mentor can also be found in Italian Letters. Collected Novels and Memoirs. Vol. 2. 
Damon and Delia, Italian Letters, Imogen. Ed. Pamela Clemit. (London: William Pickering, 1992) 81. 
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narrative, in which he confesses his usurpation of his nephew’s true name, produces an 
important metanarrative moment. Meadows writes: 
 
I cheerfully promised to lord Danvers every thing he required. I felt deeply 
interested in the story he had so unreservedly detailed to me. And, learning it as I 
did from the lips of a man, bearing an ancient title, and commanding ample 
possessions, a man highly educated, of a cultivated mind, who had figured 
honourably in the field, and who stood in the presence of princes, it struck me 
very differently from what it would have done, if I had met with it in a book, and 
read it as a memoir of incidents that had passed in a former generation. There was 
much that was commanding in the presence of lord Danvers, and impressive in his 
voice and his gestures. He had told me, as I firmly believed, the whole truth, 
without the reserve of a single particle, and had spoken of his misgivings and 
compunctions in a manner which, in spite of myself, made his feelings mine. 
There is something which can scarcely be resisted in the whole effect of a man, 
who tells you all, and speaks to you as ingenuously as he is bound to speak in the 
presence of his Creator. When he thus surrenders himself into your hands, it is 
scarcely possible that you should not give him in return your sympathy and your 
aid. (252) 
 
A figure in a book, here, tells the reader of this book that true sympathy and belief is 
generated best in person – face to face – and not in books; and thus, in that strange way 
we often see in such metanarrative moments, he raises this book beyond the mere status 
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of a book. It seems that it is Meadows’s role in the novel to stage such moments. He has 
already earlier broken into Lord Danvers’s narrative to give an extended commentary on 
the integrity and ethical greatness of Cloudesley, and to remark on how his parental and 
teacherly care and love of Julian was greater than Julian would ever know. Cloudesley 
was Mentor to Julian as Telemachus. This is already clear. And this is the role, the 
mentor-role, Lord Danvers charges Meadows with adopting. After his extended 
metanarrative commentary on the sincerity of Lord Danvers, as he sails towards Italy and 
Julian’s home, Meadows teaches himself Italian: ‘The first book I applied myself to, 
independently of the Dialogues annexed to the Grammar, was the Adventures of 
Telemachus, which had been published thirty or forty years before, and the translation of 
which into Italian is the easiest book that can be put into the hands of a learner’ (255). 
Meadows is going to have to learn how to take Coudesley’s place. Despite closing the 
novel as narrator, and despite having the opening six chapters dedicated to his own story, 
it is not Meadows but Cloudesley who is the hero of this novel. It is Cloudesley, out of 
his love for Julian, who has learnt to be Mentor, reforming himself from a misanthropist 
to a man who can transcend consanguinity and adopt a noble, benevolent, ethically pure 
disguise. And Meadows is going to have to learn how to do this too: so he reads 
Fénelon’s Telemachus. We finish the novel with Meadows accompanying Julian home to 
his rightful position and name: ‘It was his [Julian’s] desire, that the same person whom 
his uncle had chosen to be his preserver and saviour, should accompany him and be his 
Mentor in his life to come’ (284). But the crucial role Meadows plays is to narrate 
Cloudesley’s story, his transcendent teaching, his role as Mentor, and then to gift that 
narrative to the reader. 
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 Fleetwood employs Telemachus in similar, metatextual ways. The Telemachus 
intertexts centre first around Fleetwood’s mentors (Ruffigny and Macneil) and then, in 
the third volume, Fleetwood’s inability to take on the role of mentor himself. Fleetwood’s 
youth is marked by the absence of a mentor, both on a private and then a public 
educational sphere. He states, having left Oxford: ‘I was young and unguarded; I had no 
Mentor to set my follies before me in their true light; I had passed the Rubicon of vice, 
and therefore was deficient in the salutary checks of reflection.’14 The figure of Mentor, 
as this passage explains, is a reflector, a mirror to the self; a teacher who does not in-
form, but rather gives back to the pupil an image of his real self. As Deloraine puts it, 
quoting Shakespeare and referring to his perfect relationship with Emilia: ‘The eye sees 
not itself, but by reflection from some other thing.’15 But Mentor is also, as we have seen 
from the example of Cloudesley, a teacher who becomes the true, authentic father 
through a transcendence of consanguinity. This is precisely the story that Ruffingy gifts 
to Fleetwood. Fleetwood’s grandfather was Mentor to Ruffigny as Ruffigny is now 
Mentor (mirror, father-figure), or trying to be, to Fleetwood. To inform the pupil of his 
imperative to render reason, to reflect, it would appear that the mentor (friend, teacher) 
must be a mirror. It seems appropriate, in that context, to note that the metanarrative 
scenes of instruction provided by Telemachus as intertext are themselves mirrors 
(reflective surfaces) for the novels in which they appear. The whole narrative of Ruffigny 
is a metanarrative in this sense, since it serves as a commentary throughout on the 
teaching Ruffigny, in presenting the narrative of his own life, is attempting to gift to 
                                                 
14 Collected Novels and Memoirs. Vol. 5. Fleetwood: or, The New Man of Feeling. Ed. Pamela Clemit 
(London: William Pickering, 1992) 52. 
15 Collected Novels and Memoirs. Vol. 8. Deloraine. Ed. Maurice Hindle. (London: William Pickering, 
1992) 19. 
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Fleetwood. A teaching which does not in-form but encourages the pupil to reflect, think 
for himself, read. The narrative of Ruffigny, which includes the narratives of his father 
and grandfather, is a text Ruffigny gives Fleetwood to read in order that he might see 
himself.  
 Fleetwood’s response is to repeat the adventures of Telemachus. Unable to 
initially accept the lessons supplied by his mentor he starts to become ensnared by ‘the 
bewitching Mrs Comorin’ (130), who stands as the nymph Eucharis to Fleetwood’s 
Telemachus: ‘I was like Telemachus in the island of Calypso, so inflamed by the wiles of 
the God of Love, so enamoured with the graces and witchcraft of my Eucharis, that all 
remonstrances were vain’ (132). However, Ruffigny’s face saves the day, since his face is 
a text: ‘the countenance of the venerable Swiss was a book where I could trace the history 
of my ancestors . . . . From this period I became an altered man’ (136). Ruffigny is 
Mentor and thus he is a book Fleetwood can, indeed must read. And the lesson is clear: 
Fleetwood must go home and fulfil his familial destiny: ‘In me the race of the Fleetwoods 
shall survive; I will become heir to the integrity and personal honour of the virtuous 
Ruffigny’ (137). But one of the indisputable things we learn about Fleetwood is that he in 
fact is not a very good reader. He is someone who would not necessarily see the moral in 
transparent fables such as that of Alnaschar in the Arabian Nights or La Fontaine’s story 
of the milkmaid.16 He is someone, like those fictional characters, who cannot take his 
chances. And so, twenty years later, he is gifted another mentor, Macneil, who presents to 
                                                 
16 As Clemit explains: ‘Alnaschar was the dreamer who invested all his money in a basket of glassware, 
which he intended to sell and buy other wares, until he was rich enough to marry the vizier’s daughter; still 
daydreaming about how he might quarrel with her, he kicked out and broke all his glassware’ (‘The Tale of 
the Barber’s Fifth Brother’). Fleetwood, 105. Godwin wrongly attributes the story of the milkmaid to 
Aesop. Clemit gives the following account: ‘It parallels the story of Alnaschar: the milkmaid planned to 
sell the milk and buy other produce until she made enough money to buy a cow and calf; then, imagining 
how the calf would skip, she gave a skip herself, and let fall the pail of milk which she was carrying on her 
head’ (‘La Laitière et le Pot au Lait’). Fleetwood, 108. 
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him an imaginary novel in which Fleetwood is the hero; a Robinson Crusoe story in 
which the character standing for Fleetwood takes the chance, stranded on an island, of 
friendship with the only other survivor, ‘the most gross, perverse, and stupid of the crew’ 
(163). But Fleetwood is a man who even presented with a novel presumably entitled 
‘Fleetwood’ cannot read it properly, cannot take the chance of it and learn the lesson of 
human sympathy and sincerity it so transparently transmits. He even takes the advice of 
Macneil, ‘my deceased Mentor’ (220) and marries his youngest daughter and gathers his 
relations around him (Kenrick and Gifford). But as we know he does not read that advice 
accurately.  
 I am not at all suggesting that the scattered allusions and echoes of Fénelon’s 
text allow for anything like an adequate reading of the novel as a whole. Is Macneil’s 
advice, to marry a young woman and then mould her, actually such good advice to 
Fleetwood, or any man in his mid-40s? What I am saying is that these intertextual lexia 
contribute to our sense of how the novel stages metanarrative commentaries on its own 
reception. In this sense at least, paying attention to the intertexts and their function within 
the novel it is not implausible to describe Fleetwood as an anti-Telemachus, a text in 
which the questing hero fails the pedagogical process of enlightenment; fails it twice over 
in fact. Fleetwood becomes in Volume III a man who should be Mentor to others, in 
particular Mary. Fleetwood is an anti-Telemachus, and eventually an anti-Mentor, save, 
that is, for his narrative voice which can, of course, reflect on his errors and his guilt and 
his previous failure to learn and to read accurately. 
 As we know from Godwin the notion of an anti-Telemachus might work on the 
level of plot, but it is a concept we need to look at again on the level of the intellectual 
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tendency of a text such as Fleetwood. Given that texts, on the basis of the argument 
presented in ‘Of Choice in Reading,’ do not in themselves in-form, corrupt, mis-shape 
their readers, then an anti-Telemachus (a text in which Telemachus does not learn, or 
does not learn in the presence of his Mentor) can have just as ethically and rationally an 
enlightening effect on its readers as can Telemachus, Son of Ulysses. Such thoughts seem 
to be taking us closer to what we know about the Godwinian novel and its presentation of 
‘things as they are.’ The idea of an anti-Telemachus, on the level of plot, is also 
potentially highly useful in our reading of St. Leon.17 
 The intertexts again settle around two main sections. First the section that 
moves us from St Leon’s inability to benefit from Damville’s mentorship (74) through to 
the stranger’s gifting of the philosopher’s stone and elixir vitæ; the second, concerning 
the novel’s close. A rather specific allusion to Fénelon’s text occurs in the first of these 
sections. On lamenting his inability to live up to the benefits bestowed upon him by 
Damville and to act as an adequate husband to Marguerite and father to their children, St 
Leon states: ‘I could act that which had involved us in this dire reverse [i.e. act the 
gambler]; but I could not encounter the consequences of my act.’ He goes on: ‘I carried 
an arrow in my heart, which the kindness of my wife and children proved inadequate to 
extract, and the ranklings of which time itself had not the power to assuage. The wound 
was not mortal; but, like the wound of Philoctetes, poisoned with the blood of the 
Lernean hydra, I dragged it about with me from year to year, and it rendered my 
existence a galling burden hardly to be supported’ (75). As Pamela Clemit notes, 
Philoctetes had been ‘the arm-bearer and friend of Hercules’ but on his way to the Trojan 
                                                 
17 Collected Novels and Memoirs. Vol. 4. St Leon: A Tale of the Sixteenth Century. Ed. Pamela Clemit. 
(London: William Pickering, 1992). 
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War had been ‘bitten in the foot by a serpent; his cries of pain and the stench of his 
wound, which would not heal, caused Ulysses to abandon him on the island of Lemnos.’ 
Philoctetes inherited the arrows of Hercules which ‘had been dipped in the blood of the 
Hydra.’ (75) It is in Telemachus that we get a fuller account of Philoctetes’ trials. 
Philoctetes tells Telemachus how Hercules had betrayed his wife Deianeira and had died 
by the shirt of Nessus. We learn of how Hercules had sworn Philoctetes to secrecy over 
his death and his burial place. We also learn how he had given his arrows to Philoctetes, 
but how: ‘these arrows he had given me to raise me above the heroes, proved an 
inexhaustible source of woe.’ (Riley, 202) He drops by mistake one of the arrows on his 
foot and is left by Ulysses and his followers to rage in agony for years on Lemnos.18 
Neoptolemus (son of Achilles) tries to get the arrows from him, since he knows that it has 
been prophesied that Troy will be taken only if the arrows of Hercules are used in the 
siege.19 Ulysses returns and tries to get the arrows from his sworn enemy. Philoctetes 
resists until a vision of Hercules persuades him otherwise. Philoctetes joins Ulysses in the 
siege of Troy and is partly cured of his wound. 
                                                 
18 . The main tradition of the myth, in Homer’s Iliad and in Sophocles’s Philoctetes, gives a different cause 
for Philoctetes’s wound, a snake-bite. Another version claims that Philoctetes had accidentally stepped on 
the ashes of the funeral pyre of Heracles. We have then, in the myth, a wound created by natural causes, by 
irony (dropping the arrows) and by profanation. It is less than surprising and yet still potentially significant 
that both Fénelon and Godwin should choose so decisively the more modern path of irony. Certainly, the 
fact that the myth focuses on the consequences of secrets, but also on the consequences of wounds (the 
wounding of the honourable and the truthful), gives it a significance which speaks directly to Godwinian 
fiction and, indeed, modern fiction in general. 
19 Neoptolemus’s role is crucial, since it is his recognition of the humanity of Philoctetes’s situation that 
paves the way for the latter’s insight, via the intercession of the voice of Hercules, that he must find a cure 
by re-entering the political scene, embodied in the Greek war against Troy. In Seamus Heaney’s modern 
translation of Sophocles’s drama, Neoptolemus is given the quintessentially Godwinian line, addressed to 
the politically pragmatic Odysseus: ‘Since when did the use of reason rule out truth?’ Seamus Heaney. The 
Cure at Troy: A Version of Sophocles’s ‘Philoctetes’. (London: Faber and Faber, 1990) 66. St Leon fully 
merits a reading which would explore its embedded intertextual encounter, via Fénelon, with the political 
and aesthetic and psychological ramifications of the myth of Philoctetes. Such a reading might begin by 
returning to Edmund Wilson’s influential study of Sophocles’ play in the last chapter of his The Wound and 
the Bow: Seven Studies in Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1941) 272-95. 
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 There are two reasons I am labouring this intertext. First, it gives us the theme 
of an incurable wound that causes a character’s, Philoctetes’s, total, social alienation and 
that is, eventually, because of a reversal of character (i.e. in Philoctetes), partly cured. As 
part of the story of that wound there is a secret (of Hercules’s death and burial place) 
which is revealed during the narrative concerning the wound. The second reason this 
Telemachus intertext might require our extended analysis is that it returns in the text, as 
St Leon himself is given the secrets of the stranger, the secrets which will create an 
apparently incurable wound within St Leon. Just as he is about to give his secret to St 
Leon and then to die, the stranger says to him: ‘After my death I have but one injunction 
to leave with you ― the injunction of Hercules to Philocletes — that no inducement may 
move you to betray to mortal man the place in which you shall have deposited my ashes. 
Bury them in a spot which I will describe to you . . . and that once done, speak of me and, 
if possible, think of me no more’ (133-4). At the moment that St Leon is narrating this 
pivotal scene – the scene in which he receives the secret that will ruin him and all around 
him; the scene in which he receives his apparently incurable wound – St Leon is 
revealing the secret – to whom?  
 
Senseless paper! be thou at least my confidant! To thee I may impart what my 
soul spurns the task to suppress. The human mind insatiably thirsts for a confidant 
and a friend. It is no matter that these pages shall never be surveyed by other eyes 
than mine. They afford at least the semblance of communication and the 
unburdening of the mind . . . .  (137)  
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Are we presented here with the semblance or ‘simulacrum’ of a narrative turning into a 
true (authentic) narrative communication? A secret that was kept and is now revealed? A 
narrative of error turning into a text of enlightenment? An incurable wound that is partly 
healed? Answers to all these questions depend upon how we read the ending of the novel. 
What happens when we introduce Telemachus into what is already a hugely complicated 
scenario of doublings and reversals: Charles, the son, acting as friend and parental figure 
to St Leon, now Henry D’Aubigny, formerly the detested Chatillon. St Leon, disguised, 
seeking to act as parental helper to his son and only serving to bring catastrophe on him 
in alienating him from Pandora. St Leon returned to the guise of Chatillon secretly 
assisting his son for thirty years as the son persists in viewing him as his mortal enemy. 
An anti-Telemachus? A tale of secrets perpetuated or of wounds partly cured? What 
happens if we read into these scenarios a covert allusion to the end of Telemachus? 
 In Fénelon’s conclusion, Book XXIV, Telemachus meets Ulysses disguised as a 
Phyrgian sailor. Much is made in this meeting of the inexplicable attraction and sympathy 
Telemachus feels for this stranger, who has adopted the disguise of Cleomenes: ‘Then did 
a secret impression of sorrow invade the heart of Telemachus, who grieved he knew not 
why.’20 Telemachus is informed that Cleomenes is a wanderer because of the words of an 
oracle given before his birth which prophesied that he would become the leader of the 
country he settles in, but that if he remains in his homeland the Phyrgians ‘would feel the 
wrath of the gods in a cruel pestilence’ (294). Thus Cleomenes, revered by all who meet 
him, and yet unwelcome to settle in any land he visits, must wander the earth, friendless, 
                                                 
20 Tobias Smollett. (Trans.) The Adventures of Telemachus, the Son of Ulysses. Ed. O. M. Brack, Jnr. 
(Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1997) 296. I have chosen Smollett’s translation for 
most of the quotations in this essay since it is the one with which Godwin’s readers would have been most 
familiar.  
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cursed by the alienating wound of the oracle. The whole episode, when it is finally 
explained by Mentor, is meant to reaffirm the need for Telemachus to have patience 
(298). But this climactic scene also confirms the necessity and the educationally 
beneficial nature of the pedagogical mask: there have been secrets, disguises and 
allegorical fables about wandering sailors for a reason. As Mentor exposes the identity of 
Telemachus’s father in the departed Phyrgian sailor, and just before Mentor discloses her 
own identity as Minerva, he (she) reconfirms the necessity for the double structure of 
teaching. Mentor declares in a last grand statement, reminding the reader as he does of 
the Duke of Burgundy, for whom this classic text has been written: 
 
Son of Ulysses, hear me once more, and for the last time. I never took so much 
pains to instruct any mortal as you. I have led you, as it were, by the hand through 
shipwrecks, unknown lands, bloody wars, and all the disasters that the heart of 
man can encounter. I have shewn you by facts, of which you was a witness, the 
consequences of the true and false maxims adopted in government: and your 
errors have been no less serviceable to you than your misfortunes. For, who is the 
man that can pretend to rule a people wisely, who has never suffered, nor ever 
profited by the sufferings which his errors have occasioned? Like your father, you 
have filled both sea and land with your disastrous adventures. Go, you are now 
worthy of having him for your model . . . . (299) 
 
Fénelon’s text ends with a scene of instruction which stands in itself as a 
metacommentary on the text as a whole. Mentor’s speech, and his transfiguration into 
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Minerva, turn education (the adventures which are completed and narrativized) into an 
allegory which now, finally, at the proper time, is unfolded. Allegory (and Telemachus is 
one of the eighteenth-century’s great political allegories) becomes here the double 
structure of teaching, a double structure of fiction which is unfolded in and by the pupil. 
 The double structure of allegory seems to confirm the necessity for the double 
structure of teaching. We need, it would appear from Fénelon’s text, the double structure 
of friend and master, mentor and female divinity, father and stranger, before the full 
moment of the pupil’s reflection unfolds that structure, that allegory, into the singleness 
of a post-pupilic identity and agency. We seem to be back with our question concerning 
why Godwin preferred Fénelon’s text over Rousseau’s Émile. A more sustained analysis 
of the ending of St Leon, so obviously in part inspired by the conclusion of Telemachus, 
might help us to answer that question. 
 Charles, who has years previously broken with his paternal family and taken the 
maternal name of Damville, feels, like Telemachus confronting the Phrygian wanderer, 
an inexplicable attraction and sympathy for the man he has rescued from Bethlem 
Gabor’s dungeon and who he knows as Henry D’Aubiny: ‘He felt, he said, a powerful 
sympathy in my tale; there was something in my countenance that irresistibly won his 
kindness’ (352). Henry is apparently ten years his junior and Charles’s attraction extends 
to the point of an elder brother’s pedagogical concern: ‘Suffer me, my dear friend, to 
represent your better genius,’ he says to his father, ‘and act an elder brother’s part. You 
shall find me no ignorant Mentor, and no ungentle one’ (353). St Leon, for his part, like 
Ulysses before him, knows his son immediately: ‘But I knew him; I knew him in a 
moment. My soul, with the rapidity of lightning, told me who he was. Not all the arts in 
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the world could have hid him from me; not all the tales that delusion ever framed could 
have baffled me’ (349). However, it is here, after Godwin’s reiteration of the topic of 
‘natural sympathy’ between son and disguised father, that St Leon’s narrative account of 
this scenario begins to swerve away from its intertext. Mentor praises Ulysses’s secrecy 
about his true identity to Telemachus.21 It is part of the text’s confirmation of the double 
structure of instruction and fiction that Ulysses’s necessary subterfuge, even towards his 
own son, be deemed heroic and ‘sagacious.’ St Leon’s disguise, however, is a curse, a 
tragic alienation which leads eventually to a destruction of friendship and familial 
feeling, as it has done time and time again in St Leon’s lengthy narrative history. St Leon 
states:  
I was cheated, as I have once before remarked, with the form of a man, but had 
nothing of the substance . . . . I had the use of words; I could address my fellow-
beings; I could enter into dialogue with them. I could discourse of every 
indifferent thing that the universe contained; I could talk of every thing but my 
own feelings. This, and not the dungeon of Bethlem Gabor, is the true solitude. 
(374) 
 St Leon does not, like its intertext, confirm or celebrate the double scene of 
teaching. St Leon’s double disguise (he is, as Charles finds out, Chatillon disguised as 
D’Aubingy) causes an irredeemable rupture between father and son, whilst also allowing 
for the father, eventually, to assist the son in gaining his proper destiny in marriage and 
career. St Leon’s lack of identity in his social and familial relations is an incurable wound 
and a cure; he finds a true friend in his son but is unable to experience true (natural) 
                                                 
21 See Smollett, 296-7. 
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friendship with him (361-2). The novel ends with the union of Charles and Pandora and 
St Leon proudly going over his son’s accomplishments, so that he can end with the idea 
that ‘this busy and anxious world of ours yet contains something in its stores that is worth 
living for’ (383). And yet, St Leon is debarred from this ‘worth,’ and if he acts as a 
mentor to his son at the conclusion of the novel he does so as an anti-Mentor, a teacher 
and friend who cannot finally reveal himself. Reason is rendered in the son, at the end of 
St Leon, but this occurs in a context in which truth (which for Godwin always includes 
and relies upon confidence, frankness, sincerity) is missing. An irreversibly doubled, 
unenlightened scene of instruction renders reason at the end of St Leon. Which seems to 
make the novel an anti-Telemachus. And yet, as we have seen, Telemachus, for all 
Godwin’s obvious esteem for it as a text, relies on a double structure of instruction 
Godwin would eschew from the moment instruction begins. Telemachus gives us a final 
moment of self-revelation on the part of the teacher, which is perhaps why Godwin 
values it so highly, but it does so in confirmation of the necessity of the whole text’s 
allegorical and pedagogical duplicity, its fictional and educational double dealing. 
 This tension between a Telemachus and an anti-Telemachus narrative structure 
would need further examination; for now I would say that the double structure of 
teaching makes it difficult to determine whether such an opposition is in any way tenable. 
Literature, fiction, as we have seen, partake themselves of the same, or equivalent double 
structure as the Enlightenment pedagogy of Locke, Fénelon and Rousseau. Literaure can 
never say what it wants to say without or outside of the double structure of allegory. All 
literature can do is to suspend such tensions, such duplicities, in the sense of raising them 
to the view of the pupil, of our pupils. 
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 Thinking about what all this might mean for an understanding of a Godwinian 
novel such as St Leon might return us to Book I Chapter IV of the revised Political 
Justice. This is the chapter in which Godwin critiques the double structure of teaching: 
‘Preceptors are apt to pique themselves,’ he writes, ‘upon disclosing part and concealing 
part of the truth.’ He goes on: ‘But children are not inclined to consider him entirely as 
their friend, whom they detect in an attempt to impose upon them.’ Godwin adds: ‘The 
success of an attempt to mislead can never be complete:’ 
 
We continually communicate in spite of ourselves the materials of just reasoning; 
reason is the genuine exercise, and truth the native element of an intellectual 
nature; it is no wonder therefore that, with a crude and abortive plan to govern his 
efforts, the preceptor is perpetually baffled, and the pupil, who has been thus 
stored with systematic delusions, and half-discovered, clandestine truths, should 
come out any thing rather than that which his instructor intended him. (PJ IV, 25) 
 
But what are we to do as teachers, since, as Godwin goes on to state, it is difficult to see 
where a rational teacher unstained by the irrationalities of political government might 
come from. Even if we can imagine such a wholly rational teacher his pupil would be 
torn between his instruction and the powerful force of an irrational society from which he 
cannot escape: ‘From earliest infancy therefore there will be two principles contending 
for empire, the peculiar and elevated system of the preceptor, and the grovelling views of 
the great mass of mankind’ (PJ IV, 26). When this imagined child reaches puberty all hell 
will break out and the infection of the world become almost impossible to resist. All we 
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can hope for, says Godwin, finishing his chapter, ‘is that he should return at last to 
sobriety and truth, with a mind hackneyed and relaxed by repeated errors, and a moral 
constitution in which the seeds of debility have been widely and irretrievably sown’ (PJ 
IV, 27).22 
 Book I Chapter IV of the revised Political Justice, Godwin argues, is part of a 
necessary preparing of the ground before the way can be ‘sufficiently cleared for political 
melioration’ (PJ IV, 28). Yet, in itself, the chapter ends with the plotline of a Godwinian 
novel. A young man is given an enlightenment education, an education in which the 
double structure of traditional pedagogy is rejected in favour of reason sincerely and 
directly conveyed. Yet the world is what it is and we end with our hero torn between the 
two contending influences; suspended to the view of our pupils, as it were, between 
reason and the power of ideology, truth and error, true morality and moral degeneracy. 
Replacing the issue of power and moral corruption with the problem of literature’s and 
education’s apparently ineradicable double structure, St Leon, at its close, produces a 
similar suspension, a deferral of tensions which for now are irresolvable but which the 
novel, in the name of what can come, holds up to our view. We might have to 
countenance the idea that Godwin did not and could not know what he would be saying 
by the end of St Leon. And we might also have to countenance the idea that he knew that 
he did not, and could not know, what he would be saying. 
 
22 I have employed the 1793, 1796 and 1798 versions of Political Justice in this essay, although it must be 
remarked that greater attention to the textual changes between editions than I have the opportunity of 
presenting in this essay is undoubtedly required. Here, for example, that last phrase in the 1796 text is 
changed in the 1798 text to read: ‘in which the seeds of degeneracy have been deeply and extensively 
sown’ (PJ IV, 27).  
